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Abstract
The way we view ourselves may play an important role in our responses to interpersonal interactions. In this study, we
investigate how feedback valence, consistency of feedback with self-knowledge and global self-esteem influence affective
and neural responses to social feedback. Participants (N¼46) with a high range of self-esteem levels performed the social
feedback task in an MRI scanner. Negative, intermediate and positive feedback was provided, supposedly by another person
based on a personal interview. Participants rated their mood and applicability of feedback to the self. Analyses on trial basis
on neural and affective responses are used to incorporate applicability of individual feedback words. Lower self-esteem
related to low mood especially after receiving non-applicable negative feedback. Higher self-esteem related to increased
posterior cingulate cortex and precuneus activation (i.e. self-referential processing) for applicable negative feedback. Lower
self-esteem related to decreased medial prefrontal cortex, insula, anterior cingulate cortex and posterior cingulate cortex
activation (i.e. self-referential processing) during positive feedback and decreased temporoparietal junction activation
(i.e. other referential processing) for applicable positive feedback. Self-esteem and consistency of feedback with self-
knowledge appear to guide our affective and neural responses to social feedback. This may be highly relevant for the inter-
personal problems that individuals face with low self-esteem and negative self-views.
Key words: social feedback; fMRI; self-concept; self-referential processing; self-esteem
Introduction
Feedback from others informs us about our social standing and
whether the way we view ourselves is in line with the way
others view us (Swann, 1982; Cross and Markus, 1999; Over,
2016). Processing and responding to social feedback is highly
relevant for updating our self-concept as this allows us to learn
and grow and adapt to our social environments (Markus and
Cross, 1990; vanDellen et al., 2011; Swann and Brooks, 2012). Our
self-concept is not only shaped through interaction with others,
it also shapes our responses to these interactions (Markus and
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Wurf, 1987; Chen et al., 2006). Our self-concept guides us in
which feedback should be processed and which dismissed as ir-
relevant (Markus and Wurf, 1987; Ahern et al., 2015).
Two main components of the self-concept are relevant in
the context of our social interactions, self-knowledge and global
self-esteem (Campbell et al., 2003). Self-knowledge is accumu-
lated through experiencing consistencies in information about
our attributes (Swann and Brooks, 2012). People can more easily
process information that is consistent with their self-
knowledge (Higgins, 1987; Vignoles et al., 2006; Stinson et al.,
2010). Inconsistent social feedback induces tension, anger and
confusion, regardless of the valence of the feedback (Higgins,
1987; Stinson et al., 2010). Self-esteem is thought to emerge
through setting standards for ourselves which may be derived
from what others implicitly or explicitly expect of us (Shavelson
et al., 1976; Higgins, 1987). The level of self-esteem is related to
our sensitivity to social feedback. Individuals with low self-
esteem tend to experience more and longer lasting distress after
rejection compared to individuals with high self-esteem (Nezlek
et al., 1997; Bernichon et al., 2003; Brown, 2010; Ford and Collins,
2013). Neuroimaging studies indicate that during social rejec-
tion lower self-esteem is associated with both decreased and
increased activation in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and
ventral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), interpreted as decreased
emotion regulation or increased social pain (Onoda et al., 2010;
Somerville et al., 2010; Gyurak et al., 2012).
So far, most studies have focussed on how individuals re-
spond to social feedback without taking into account whether
the specific feedback is consistent with that individual’s self-
concept. For example, studies on social rejection have shown
that individuals, quite obviously, do not like to be rejected and
that this acutely lowers mood (Leary, 2005; Blackhart et al., 2009;
Cacioppo et al., 2013; Rotge et al., 2015). Moreover, on a neural
level, rejection induces a different activation pattern [inferior
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior insula, ACC (pgACC, sgACC
and aMCC) and caudate nucleus] (Cacioppo et al., 2013; Rotge
et al., 2015) than acceptance (mPFC and vACC) (Somerville et al.,
2006). Some recent findings also point to neural commonalities
for both acceptance and rejection in the insula, dACC and
mPFC, indicating that not only valence but also the social and
self-relevancy of feedback is important (Achterberg et al., 2016;
Dalgleish et al., 2017). The binary feedback provided to partici-
pants in conventional social feedback paradigms [e.g. being
included or excluded (Onoda et al., 2010), or being liked or dis-
liked by peers based on a photograph (Somerville et al., 2010)],
does not allow to consider the relevance of self-knowledge.
Eisenberger et al. (2011) did use personal feedback (e.g. present-
ing nouns such as lazy, annoying) and found that feedback
which lowers self-esteem at that moment, increases activation
in the dorsal ACC and anterior insula (Eisenberger et al., 2011).
This novel paradigm allows for an assessment of the consist-
ency between feedback and self-knowledge, though it was not
done in that study.
Furthermore, no studies directly assessed which brain re-
gions are involved in the processing of the (in)consistency of so-
cial feedback with an individual’s self-knowledge. We postulate
that the Cortical Midline Structures [CMS, i.e. mPFC, ACC, pos-
terior cingulate cortex (PCC) and precuneus] may be involved in
this process as they play a critical role in thinking about the self
and whether information is relevant to the self (Fossati et al.,
2003; Phan et al., 2004; Northoff et al., 2006; Moran et al., 2011;
Bergstrom et al., 2015). More importantly, we postulate that con-
sistency of social feedback may interact with valence of feed-
back and self-esteem. While individuals with high self-esteem
possess a clear self-concept with predominantly positive attri-
butes, the self-concept of individuals with low self-esteem con-
sists of conflicting attributes (Campbell et al., 1996). Therefore,
the threat from negative feedback to the self-concept, especially
when inconsistent with self-knowledge, may be larger for indi-
viduals with low self-esteem as they may meet more difficulties
refusing it (vanDellen et al., 2011).
In sum, previous experimental studies have shown that
feedback has a particular strong impact when it is negative and
inconsistent with our self-knowledge and that the impact may
differ depending on self-esteem. Our knowledge is still limited
in terms of shared and unique neural correlates of positive and
negative feedback. So far, no studies have investigated how
(in)consistency of social feedback with self-knowledge is pro-
cessed in the brain. To provide a better understanding of how
the self-concept affects our neural and affective responses to
social feedback (idiosyncratic nouns with a negative, positive or
intermediate valence), this study evaluates the role of valence,
the (in)consistency between feedback and self-knowledge and
self-esteem. To increase our understanding of the role of self-
esteem on responses to social feedback, this study included par-
ticipants along the full spectrum of global self-esteem, includ-
ing participants with clinically low self-esteem (Schmitt and
Allik, 2005; Korrelboom, 2011).
Methods
Participants
Female participants (N¼ 46) from the general population
(age: M¼ 29.6, s.d.¼ 9.5, range 18–54 years) were included with
a broad range of trait self-esteem (range 8–29, possible range
0–30), including 14 participants who reported clinically low
trait self-esteem (cut-off< 18) (Rosenberg, 1965; Schmitt and
Allik, 2005; Korrelboom, 2011). Education levels ranged from
high school to university level (Table 1). Eleven participants
reported one or two lifetime axis I disorder (Table 1). Uniquely,
four participants1 reported the use of medication (N by type):
antidepressants N¼ 1 (SSRI: Sertraline 100 mg); sleep medica-
tion N¼ 1 (Lorazepam); and medication for physical ailments
N¼ 3 [(Valsartan, Insulin, Ventolin (salbutamol), Foster (formo-
terol), and Levothyroxine]. Trait self-esteem was not related to
age or education level but was related to the likelihood of hav-
ing a lifetime axis I disorder (OR¼ 0.84, 95% CI 0.73–0.96).
Participants were recruited using online advertisements as
well as local posters and flyers. We only included women as
they may be more sensitive to social feedback (Stroud et al.,
2002; Benenson et al., 2013). Exclusion criteria were incompati-
bility with the MRI scanner, current axis I disorder diagnosis
and usage of benzodiazepines, antipsychotics or more than
20 mg of Oxazepam. Most participants were right handed
(N¼ 40, 87%) (Table 1) (van Strien, 1992). Two participants were
excluded from analyses because of scanner artefacts resulting
in the sample of 46 participants described above.
Participants signed for their informed consent to participate
in this study. The study was approved by the medical ethics
committee of the Leiden University Medical Centre (P12.249)
and was performed in accordance with the declaration of
Helsinki and the Dutch Medical Research Involving Human
Subjects Act (WMO).
1 Two participants took two kinds of medication for physical ailments,
one participant took sleep medication as well as medication for high
blood pressure, and one participant solely took SSRI medication.
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Social feedback task
Participants performed the social feedback task (SF task) in
which they received evaluative feedback that putatively was
given by another female participant who in reality was a con-
federate to the study. Preceding the SF task, the participant and
the confederate were introduced and received instructions to-
gether. The participant was informed that she would receive
personal feedback from the confederate based on a personal
interview in the context of a study about forming impressions.
The confederate was then ostensibly taken to another MRI scan-
ner to give feedback on the personal interview. The participant
was interviewed using personal questions and was confronted
with three moral dilemmas (see Supplementary Material). The
full interview was recorded using a voice recorder and was sup-
posedly given to the confederate to base their evaluative feed-
back on.
The SF task was based on an existing social feedback-task
(Eisenberger et al., 2011). Two important modifications were
made: only one feedback word was presented per trial to ensure
that participants would focus on the content of this specific
word and more feedback words (N¼ 45) were included to in-
crease the number of trials without repeating feedback words.
Participants performed the SF task whilst lying in an MRI scan-
ner and were presented with 45 feedback words (see
Supplementary Material), i.e. 15 negative (e.g. ‘arrogant’), 15
positive (e.g. ‘happy’) and 15 intermediate (e.g. ‘reserved’)
nouns. The feedback was presented in random order with the
condition that no consecutive trials could be of the same va-
lence. However, to speed up computer randomization time the
trials were split in two parts (23 and 22 trials) which were then
merged resulting in possibly one trial being followed by the
same valence. After each word the participant was asked how
she felt right now (mood) responding on a scale of 1 (¼ really
bad) to 4 (¼ really good) using scanner button boxes2 attached to
the legs. Figure 1 shows the timings and displays of one trial.
Once outside the scanner participants rated all the feedback
words in terms of applicability (scale: 1—‘not at all applicable to
me’ to 4—‘very much applicable to me’) and valence (scale: 4—
‘very negative’, to 0—‘neutral’, to 4—‘very positive’) and their
general experience of the SF task and the confederate in four
questions (Supplementary Table S1). Before debriefing a brief
manipulation check interview was held (see Supplementary
Material).
Measures and materials
Psychopathology
To assess lifetime and current Axis-I disorders based on DSM-IV
the MINI-plus, a semi-structured interview (First et al., 1997) was
used by a trained psychologist (C.v.S.) who held the interview by
telephone.
Trait self-esteem
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) measures the level of
trait self-esteem using the sum of ten items that can be an-
swered on a four point scale ranging from totally agree to totally
disagree (Rosenberg, 1965). The Dutch translation has been well
validated (Schmitt and Allik, 2005; Franck et al., 2008). The reli-
ability was good (a¼ 0.89).
Procedure
Participants were screened by phone and with online question-
naires on compatibility with the MRI scanner (e.g. no metal ob-
jects in their body), axis I disorders, and medication use.
Moreover, participants filled out a handedness questionnaire
(scale: 10 to 10) (van Strien, 1992). After screening and inclu-
sion two appointments were made. During the first appoint-
ment participants signed informed consent, filled in a
demographic form and the RSES and were prepared for the MRI
scan session. During the second appointment, they performed
the SF task in the MRI scanner. On average there were 20.0
(s.d.¼ 30.5) days between the administration of the RSES and
the fMRI scan. The temporal stability of the RSES is quite good
[test–retest reliability at 2 weeks¼ 0.84 (Fleming and Courtney,
1984; Pullmann and Allik, 2000)]. After the experiment partici-
pants were debriefed of the set-up of the experiment including
the fake feedback and received a monetary reward of e30.
Data acquisition
The SF task was programmed in E-prime 2.0. MRI images were
acquired using a Phillips 3.0 Tesla scanner equipped with a
SENSE-8 channel head coil and situated as the Leiden
University Medical Centre (LUMC). A survey scan and an initial
resting state scan were completed first. T2*-weighted echo pla-
nar imaging (EPI) was used during the SF task with the following
parameters: FOV RL: 220 mm, AP: 220 mm, FH: 114.68 mm;
Matrix 8080, Voxel size RL: 2.75 mm AP: 2.75 mm; Slice thick-
ness 2.75 mm; Interslice skip 0.275 mm; 38 transverse slices in
descending order; TE 30 ms, TR 2200 ms, Flip Angle 80. Number
of volumes (M¼ 161.78, s.d.¼ 19.04) varied as the SF task was
self-paced. For registration purposes a four volume high reso-
lution T2*-weighted EPI and a structural 3D T1 scan were
acquired. The parameters for the T2 scan were: FOV RL:
220 mm, AP: 220 mm, FH: 168 mm; Matrix 112112, Voxel size
RL: 1.96 mm AP: 1.96 mm; Slice thickness 2.0 mm; 84 transverse
slices; TE 30 ms, TR 2200 ms, Flip Angle 80. The parameters for
Table 1. Demographic data (N¼ 46)
Variable Mean (s.d.)/count (%)
Age (Years) 29.35 (9.7)
Education
High school 3 (6.5%)
Vocational training (MBO) 22 (48%)
Higher education (HBO & University) 21 (46%)
Trait self-esteem (RSES) 20.65 (5.6)
State DERQ
Handedness 7.93 (5.13)
Right handed (>7) 40 (87%)
Left handed (<7) 2 (4%)
Ambidextrous (7 7) 4 (9%)
Axis I Disorder (MINI-plus)
Mood disorders 7 (15%)
Anxiety disorders 3 (6.5%)
PTSD 1 (2.2%)
ADHD 0
Substance abuse & addiction 0
Other disorders 2 (4.3%)
2 Participants used both hands to indicate their mood rating. This was
not randomised and therefore pressing with the left hand is associated
with negative mood and vice versa. This is visible as activation in the
sensorimotor cortex (pre- and postcentral gyrus) in the contrasts on
valence.
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the 3D T1 scan were: FOV RL: 177.33 mm, AP: 224 mm, FH:
168 mm; Matrix 256256, Voxel size RL: 0.88 mm AP: 0.87 mm;
Slice thickness 1.20 mm; 140 transverse slices; TE 4.6 ms, TR
9.7 ms, Flip Angle 8; Duration 4: 55 min. Scans were examined
by a radiologist and no abnormalities were found.
Data pre-processing and analysis
Affective responses
Responses to the SF task were pre-processed using Excel 2010
and IBM SPSS statistics version 23 and analysed using R version
3.3.0 with the following packages: lme4 for multilevel analysis,
psych for descriptive statistics and ggplot2 for creating figures
(Wickham, 2009; R Core Team, 2013; Bates et al., 2015). Multi-level
analysis was used to analyse the affective responses during the
SF task, to incorporate individualised trial based information.
On the first level, the characteristics related to the feedback,
i.e. valence and applicability, for each feedback word for each
participant was specified. The second level consists of the trait
characteristics of the individuals, i.e. trait self-esteem (RSES)
(Hox, 2010). The intermediate valence was set as the reference
category (intercept). Both mood and applicability ratings were
recoded from 1, 2, 3, 4 to contrast values 3, 1, 1, 3 and RSES
was centred on the sample mean. To be able to test for the
significance of main and interaction effects, we constructed
five models increasing in complexity adding first main and
interaction effects of valence and applicability and finally
adding trait self-esteem, see Table 2 for the construction of
models 1–5.
Neural responses
Data were pre-processed using Feat v6.00 in FSL 5.0.7. The first
5 vol were discarded. A high pass filter of 80 s was used. Motion
was corrected using MCFLIRT with 6 degrees of freedom (dof)
and the middle volume as reference volume. No slice time cor-
rection was used but temporal derivatives were added in the
model. Data were spatially smoothed with FWHM of 5 mm. Raw
and pre-processed data were checked for quality, registration
and movement. No participant moved more than 3 mm. For
higher level analysis data were registered to the MNI152 2 mm
template. The middle volume was registered to the high
resolution T2 image using 6 dof. The Boundary-Based
Registration algorithm was used for registration to the anatom-
ical T1 scan. A linear 12 dof transformation was used for regis-
tration to the template.
On the individual analysis level, an event related design was
applied where valence and applicability were simultaneously
included in one model. For each valence, the onset and duration
of each word was specified with equal weighting, resulting in
three regressors for valence. To investigate the impact of the ap-
plicability of the feedback, parametric modulation analysis was
used where for each valence category each trial was modulated
with the recoded applicability ratings resulting in another three
regressors. The onset and duration of the mood question was
modelled as a regressor of no interest. The bold response was
convolved with the double-gamma HRF function. Six motion
parameters indicating rotation and translation and mean time
series of white matter and cerebrospinal fluid were added as
confound regressors (Birn et al., 2006; McCabe et al., 2011; Cheng
and Puce, 2014). T-contrasts were formulated to compare nega-
tive and positive feedback to each other and to intermediate
feedback, to test the main effect of applicability, and the inter-
action between valence (neg/pos) and applicability. To test the
moderating role of trait self-esteem on valence and applicabil-
ity, a group-level model containing constant, centred RSES and
one group variance was used. A mixed effects model with the
FLAME1 method was used for group level inference. Data were
cluster corrected with Z> 2.3 and cluster P< 0.05. This cluster
correction using the FLAME 1 method has been shown to be a
conservative method where the amount of false positives stays
within limits (Eklund et al., 2016). In addition, we used mood as
parametric modulator in one model with valence to replicate
the analysis of Eisenberger et al., (2011). These results can be
found in Supplementary Table S2.
For the labelling of peak voxels, the Harvard–Oxford structural
atlas was used for cortical and subcortical regions (Frazier et al.,
2005; Desikan et al., 2006; Makris et al., 2006; Goldstein et al., 2007),
and Mars connectivity-based parcellation for temporoparietal
junction (TPJ) and inferior parietal lobule (IPL) areas (Mars et al.,
2011, 2012). For cerebellum coordinates, the cerebellar atlas was
used (Diedrichsen et al., 2009). To indicate Brodmann areas,
Talairach Daemon labels were used (Lancaster et al., 2000).
Fig. 1. Timings and displays of one trial in the SF task.
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Results
Validation of the SF task
The 45 feedback words used in the SF task were chosen from 96
previously validated words (e.g. Eisenberger et al., 2011) that
were rated for their valence on a scale of 4 to 4 in a pilot study
(N¼ 19, age M¼ 29.6, s.d.¼ 10.0). The 15 most positive and nega-
tive rated feedback words that were not contradictory in mean-
ing were chosen. Intermediate feedback consisted of the words
with a score close to zero and smallest standard deviation. The
participants’ mean valence ratings of feedback were in accord-
ance with the pilot sample [r(43)¼ 0.98, P< 0.001]. Multilevel
analysis showed that negative feedback (M¼2.65, s.d.¼ 1.53,
t¼34.19) was rated as more negative than intermediate feed-
back (M¼ 0.22, s.d.¼ 2.06), which was rated as less positive than
positive feedback (M¼ 3.17, s.d.¼ 1.15, t¼ 35.17) [Valence:
v2(7)¼ 2583.30, P< 0.001]. Even though the range of applicability
ratings was the same for each valence (i.e. 3 to 3), positive
feedback (M¼ 1.70, s.d.¼ 1.33, t¼ 9.23) was rated as more applic-
able than intermediate feedback (M¼ 0.66, s.d.¼ 1.95) which
was rated as more applicable than negative feedback
(M¼1.75, s.d.¼ 1.64, t¼20.33) [Valence: v2(7)¼ 1295.53,
P< 0.001]. Trait self-esteem did not affect applicability ratings of
negative (b¼0.03, SE¼ 0.02, t¼1.41) or positive feedback
(b¼ 0.03, SE¼ 0.02, t¼ 1.67) compared to intermediate feedback
[ValenceTrait self-esteem: v2(2)¼ 4.99, P¼ 0.08]. There were no
multicollinearity issues (all VIF’s< 3.90) in the models below.
Regarding the manipulation check, almost all participants
(N¼ 42, 91%) indicated they believed the feedback of the confed-
erate was real. Regarding the general experience of the SF task,
participants who thought that the feedback described them
well, also held a more positive view of the confederate [b¼ .44,
t(43)¼ 3.84, P< 0.001] (Supplementary Table S1). This relation-
ship was moderated by trait self-esteem [b¼ 0.07, t(43)¼ 3.66,
P¼ 0.001] and self-esteem was negatively related to liking the
confederate [b¼0.94, t(43)¼2.64, P¼ 0.012], indicating that
participants with lower self-esteem held a more positive view
of the confederate regardless of whether the feedback described
them well.
Affective responses to social feedback
Valence and applicability
The model containing all main effects and two- and three-way
interaction effects of valence, applicability and trait self-esteem
was significant [v2(6)¼ 18.58, P¼ 0.005]. Effect parameters re-
ported here are derived from this model (model 5) (Table 2).
First, we discuss how valence and applicability of the feedback
and their interaction influenced participants’ mood. Receiving
negative feedback (b¼1.00, SE¼ 0.11, t¼9.22) decreased
mood compared to receiving intermediate feedback [b (inter-
cept)¼ 0.45, SE¼ 0.13, t¼ 3.60], whereas positive feedback com-
pared to intermediate feedback enhanced mood [b¼ 1.20,
SE¼ 0.13, t¼ 9.04] (Figure 2A). As hypothesized, feedback that
was rated as less applicable was associated with decreased
mood, regardless of valence (b¼ 0.28, SE¼ 0.03, t¼ 9.07).
Moreover, the interaction between valence and applicability,
indicated that negative and intermediate feedback are even
more detrimental for mood when they are less applicable,
whereas mood after positive feedback is not moderated
by applicability as much (b¼0.11, SE¼ 0.04, t¼2.65)
(Figure 2A).
Trait self-esteem
On top of the findings reported above, there was a main effect
for trait self-esteem (b¼ 0.05, SE¼ 0.02, t¼ 2.01), indicating that
lower levels of trait self-esteem were related to a lower mood
overall. Furthermore, level of trait self-esteem moderated mood
after negative and intermediate feedback, but not after positive
feedback (b¼0.05, SE¼ 0.02, t¼1.89), indicating that negative
and intermediate feedback has a more detrimental effect on
mood for participants with lower trait self-esteem compared to
participants with high self-esteem. Finally, the three-way inter-
action between trait self-esteem, applicability and negative
feedback showed that participants with lower self-esteem re-
port an additional decrease in mood after negative feedback
which is not applicable, whereas participants with higher self-
esteem are less affected by inapplicable negative feedback
(b¼0.01, SE¼ 0.01, t¼1.95) (Figure 2B and Supplementary
Table S3 for all effect parameters).
Neural responses to social feedback
Valence
In line with our hypotheses, we found that negative feedback
compared to positive feedback was related to increased activa-
tion in the bilateral anterior insula, bilateral orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC), ACC (aMCC, not pgACC and sgACC), bilateral caudate nu-
cleus, and additionally in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), left
superior and middle frontal gyrus, left precuneus and left the
lingual gyrus (Figure 3A). For cluster sizes and peak voxels, see
Table 3.3 Compared to intermediate feedback, negative feedback
Table 2. Models predicting mood after each feedback word based on valence and applicability of the feedback and trait self-esteem (the intra-
class correlation¼ 0.12)
Model of mood after feedback AIC BIC Log likelihood v2 (df), P
Null model: random intercepts only 8383.1 8400.0 4188.6
Model 1: valence 7132.4 7160.5 3561.2 v2(2) ¼ 1254.75, P < 0.001
Model 2: applicability 6979.3 7013.1 3483.7 v2(1) ¼ 155.08, P < 0.001
Model 3: valenceapplicability interaction 6976.1 7021.2 3480.1 v2(2) ¼ 7.17, P ¼ 0.028
Model 4: random effects of valence and applicability 6620.9 6716.6 3293.5 v2(9) ¼ 373.20, P < 0.001
Model 5: trait self-esteem and all two and three-way interactions 6614.3 6743.8 3284.2 v2(6) ¼ 18.58, P ¼ 0.005
Notes: Adding applicability of the feedback and its interaction with valence (models 2 and 3) and random effects of applicability and valence (model 4) significantly im-
proved the model. Adding trait self-esteem and all two and three-way interactions (model 5) was an improvement compared to model 4.
3 As there were many peak voxels, only a selection representative of the
cluster is reported here. All peak voxels can be found in
Supplementary Table 4.
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was related to activation in the precuneus, PCC, left superior
frontal gyrus, left frontal pole, left lateral occipital cortex and
left TPJ. Positive feedback compared to negative feedback eli-
cited activation in the ACC, PCC, cuneus, left posterior insula,
and right lingual gyrus (Figure 3B; Table 3). Compared to inter-
mediate feedback, positive feedback was related to increased
activity in the PCC, precuneus, right TPJ, left posterior insula
and right lingual gyrus.
Fig. 2. (A) Mean mood ratings for negative (red), intermediate (blue) and positive (green) feedback which is not or very applicable and (B) mean mood ratings further
split by three levels of trait self-esteem (1 s.d. below the mean, mean level and 1 s.d. above the mean).
Fig. 3. Neural activation related to valence and applicability of the feedback, cluster threshold with z¼2.3 and cluster P<0.05. To facilitate comparability
of results, similar coordinates have been used for visualisation. (A) Activation related to negative feedback compared to positive (red) and intermediate (blue)
feedback. (B) Activation related to positive feedback compared to negative (green) and intermediate (blue) feedback. (C) Activation positively related to applicability of
feedback.
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Applicability
Less applicable feedback, regardless of valence, was related to
decreased activation in the left precuneus (Figure 3C and the
left superior and middle frontal gyrus; Table 4). There were
three-way interaction effects with valence and trait self-
esteem, see below.
Trait self-esteem
In line with the affective results and our hypothesis, we found
that level of trait self-esteem moderated the activation for
negative feedback. Lower self-esteem was related to decreased
activation in the left middle temporal gyrus (MTG) (Table 5 and
Figure 4A). During positive feedback, lower self-esteem was
related to decreased activation in the bilateral mPFC, insula,
ACC and PCC. Moreover, lower self-esteem was related to
decreased left TPJ activation in response to more applicable
feedback.
In line with the effects on mood, we found a three-way inter-
action of trait self-esteem, applicability and negative feedback
in the PCC and precuneus (Figure 4C). Participants with higher
self-esteem showed increased PCC and precuneus activation for
Table 3. Neural correlates of feedback valence
Contrast Cluster size Cluster P-value Label peak voxels Voxel test value MNI coordinates
Z X Y Z
Negative > positive 2987 <0.001 R Postcentral gyrus 5.67 38 22 48
R Lateral occipital cortex, SPLD, BA7 5.25 18 70 56
1847 <0.001 R Caudate 4.36 10 12 2
L OFC 4.13 38 28 0
L IFG 3.92 56 22 16
L Caudate 3.83 12 2 16
L Insula 3.71 28 22 0
1174 <0.001 L Superior frontal gyrus, BA8 4.47 2 46 38
L Frontal poleBA9 3.59 18 54 26
R Paracingulate gyrus, ACC 3.47 14 20 36
912 <0.001 R Crus I 5.19 28 80 34
R Crus II 3.23 12 90 40
368 0.027 L Middle frontal gyrus 4.30 42 14 44
L Middle frontal gyrus, BA6 2.50 38 4 58
Negative > intermediate 1695 <0.001 L PCC 3.93 6 36 32
Precuneus, BA7 3.90 0 52 40
R PCC 3.85 2 38 24
1422 <0.001 R Precentral gyrus 4.77 36 20 56
R Postcentral gyrus, IPLB, BA3 4.74 40 22 52
809 <0.001 L Frontal pole 4.33 22 42 22
L Frontal pole, BA10 3.79 24 56 20
L Superior frontal gyrus 3.48 8 50 32
523 0.003 L Lateral occipital cortex 3.62 38 78 32
L Lateral occipital cortex, BA19 2.99 34 76 42
399 0.016 L Angular gyrus 3.69 42 50 30
L Lateral occipital cortex 3.26 58 62 14
Positive > negative 4137 <0.001 L Precentral gyrus, BA4 5.91 38 18 56
L Postcentral gyrus 5.31 38 26 56
3872 <0.001 R Lingual gyrus, VI 5.40 18 66 12
R Temporal occipital fusiform cortex, VI 5.32 22 58 16
644 0.001 L ACC, BA24 4.82 6 4 46
L ACC 4.76 6 2 42
554 0.002 L Occipital pole 4.56 14 96 10
L Occipital pole, BA17 3.98 14 94 4
L Occipital pole, BA18 2.78 0 96 2
Positive > intermediate 2407 <0.001 L Postcentral gyrus, BA1 5.44 50 22 58
L Precentral gyrus, BA4 5.14 36 16 64
1599 <0.001 R Temporal occipital fusiform cortex, VI 4.74 28 56 20
R Lingual gyrus, V 4.21 6 60 6
1560 <0.001 L Juxtapositional lobule 4.70 2 12 52
R Precuneus, BA7 4.02 10 66 38
R PCC 4.01 12 34 36
692 <0.001 R MTG 3.57 48 54 8
R Angular gyrus, TPJa, TPJp, BA40 3.33 56 46 24
607 0.001 L Heschl’s gyrus, BA41 4.00 46 22 12
L Central opercular cortex, BA40 3.94 48 22 16
L Insula 3.52 36 16 4
Note: All clusters with selected peak voxels, cluster corrected z¼2.3, cluster P< .05
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more applicable negative feedback and conversely, decreased
PCC and precuneus activation for less applicable negative feed-
back (Table 5; Figure 4D). On the other hand, for participants
with low self-esteem applicability of negative feedback was less
related to PCC and precuneus activation. Finally, there was a
three-way interaction between trait self-esteem, applicability
and positive feedback in the left MTG and TPJ (Figure 4C).
Participants with lower self-esteem showed decreased activa-
tion in the left MTG and left posterior TPJ in response to positive
applicable feedback (Table 5; Figure 4D). The TPJ area over-
lapped with activation found for applicability moderated by
trait self-esteem (Figure 4B). The TPJ and MTG activation may
indicate other-referential thinking.
Confounds
The use of psychotropic medication (on/off) and whether
participants believed the feedback as coming from the con-
federate (yes/no) were additionally taken into account in the
affective analyses and did not change the results. Even when
removing participants who did not believe in the experimen-
tal manipulation (N¼ 4) or took medication (N¼ 4), the same
affective results remained. In the neural analyses, the degree
of left or right handedness was taken into account as well.
Medication and believing status led to minor changes in neu-
ral findings. When adding handedness or removing left-
handed and ambidextrous participants (N¼ 6) or participants
that took medication, the three-way interaction between ap-
plicability, self-esteem and positive valence failed to reach
significance. This effect altered when removing participants
who did not believe in the experimental manipulation to the
more posterior part of both the TPJ and MTG. Furthermore,
removing participants based on handedness had an impact
on the interaction effect between self-esteem and negative
feedback and self-esteem and applicability. Finally, the
three-way interaction between applicability, self-esteem and
negative valence failed to reach significance when removing
participants based on believing status.
Discussion
In this study, we simultaneously investigated the influence of
social feedback valence (negative, intermediate and positive),
consistency of the feedback with self-knowledge, and self-
esteem and showed that all are important in affective and neu-
ral responses to social feedback.
In terms of valence, we found that negative feedback, in line
with social rejection studies, decreased mood and activated the
bilateral anterior insula, OFC and caudate nucleus and ACC
(aMCC) (Blackhart et al., 2009; Cacioppo et al., 2013; Rotge et al.,
2015). In addition, negative feedback activated the bilateral IFG,
PCC, left precuneus, left lingual gyrus, left TPJ and left middle
frontal gyrus. These areas are commonly found in relation to
self- and other-referential thinking (Northoff et al., 2006; Schurz
et al., 2014). The IFG, PCC and precuneus are part of the CMS and
are important for evaluating self-relevant stimuli (Northoff
et al., 2006). This is in line with the fact that many participants
indicated at debriefing that they were reflecting on their an-
swers during the interview. The TPJ is implicated in self- but
even more in other-referential thinking and is reliably found in
the Theory of Mind network for thinking about the mental
states of others (Molnar-Szakacs and Uddin, 2013; Schurz et al.,
2014). As many participants also indicated at debriefing that
they were pondering about the choices of the confederate, this
could point to participants thinking about the person evaluating
them. Our paradigm, using more personal feedback and a con-
federate, seems to elicit more self- and other referential think-
ing than paradigms using impersonal rejection feedback such
as the Cyberball game.
The insula and ACC activation we found in relation to nega-
tive feedback is not necessarily rejection specific as recent stud-
ies have pointed to common neural activation for both rejection
and acceptance in these areas (Achterberg et al., 2016; Dalgleish
et al., 2017). We found that positive feedback, in line with ac-
ceptance feedback, enhanced mood and activated the ACC
(pMCC), left posterior insula as well as PCC, cuneus, the right
lingual gyrus, right MTG and right TPJ (Somerville et al., 2006;
Blackhart et al., 2009). Both feedback valences activated the ACC
and insula; however, each valence activated a different part.
Table 4. Neural correlates of feedback applicability
Contrast Cluster size Cluster P-value Label peak voxels Voxel test value MNI coordinates
Z X Y Z
Applicability (positive relation
with activity)
2417 <0.001 L Lateral occipital cortex, BA19 4.02 28 70 48
L Precuneus 3.94 6 66 50
L Superior parietal lobule 3.88 32 58 54
464 0.006 L Superior frontal gyrus 3.68 26 20 50
L Middle frontal gyrus, BA6 3.40 26 8 48
L Superior frontal gyrus, BA8 3.38 18 28 40
Applicability (negative
relation with activity)
1049 <0.001 R Precentral gyrus 4.19 56 8 46
R Postcentral gyrus, IPLB, IPLA 3.77 50 20 46
917 <0.001 L VI 3.66 28 56 24
L Occipital fusiform gyrus, VI 3.58 18 68 14
L Lingual gyrus 3.50 12 56 8
ApplicabilityNeg 336 0.039 L Precentral gyrus, BA4 3.98 38 20 58
L Postcentral gyrus, BA3 2.36 26 30 52
ApplicabilityPos –
Note: All clusters with selected peak voxels, cluster corrected z¼2.3, cluster P<0.05. The interaction effect between applicability and negative valence did not reach
significance when adding handedness.
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Negative feedback was more related to the ventral part of the
ACC (aMCC) and anterior part of the insula, whereas positive
feedback activated the dorsal part of the ACC (pMCC) and pos-
terior part of the insula. Previous studies showed that the more
ventral part of the ACC is associated with the encoding of self-
relatedness of stimuli and the regulation of negative stimuli,
whereas the more dorsal part of the ACC is related to re-
appraisal and evaluation of self-related and positive stimuli
Fig. 4. Neural activation related to trait self-esteem, cluster threshold with z¼2.3 and cluster P<0.05. To facilitate comparability of results, similar coordinates have
been used for visualisation. (A) Moderation of trait self-esteem during positive (green) and negative (red) feedback. (B) Moderation of trait self-esteem with applicability
of feedback. (C) Interaction effect of trait self-esteem and applicability of feedback during positive (green) and negative (red) feedback. (D) Scatterplot of contrast values
in precuneus (left) and TPJ (right) for negative (red triangles), intermediate (blue squares) and positive feedback (green diamonds) for three-way interaction of valence
by applicability against level of trait self-esteem.
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(Northoff et al., 2006; Mak et al., 2009; Etkin et al., 2011). With re-
spect to the insula, the anterior part seems more important for
detecting stimuli and thoughts as self-relevant and facilitating
emotional awareness, whereas the posterior part of the insula
is related to interoceptive awareness (Craig, 2011; Gu et al., 2013;
Simmons et al., 2013). Negative feedback seems more related to
becoming aware of and regulating forthcoming emotions
whereas positive feedback is more related to reappraising the
feedback (Northoff et al., 2006; Etkin et al., 2011; Wiebking and
Northoff, 2015). More common neural activation for negative
and positive feedback compared to intermediate feedback was
found in the PCC and TPJ, relevant for self- and other referential
thinking. In sum, negative and positive feedback commonly in-
cite the process of evaluating the relevancy of feedback to the
self and the person providing it but may differ in responding to
the feedback and resulting emotions. It could be thought that
this could be due to negative feedback being more of a threat to
the self-concept and social standing (Leary, 2005; vanDellen
et al., 2011). However, more research is needed to delineate the
specific processes underlying the common and unique neural
correlates of negative and positive feedback.
In terms of applicability, feedback that was rated as more
applicable was related to a better mood. This relates well to pre-
vious findings that confirming existing self-knowledge with
consistent feedback is experienced as more pleasurable
(Stinson et al., 2010). Moreover, feedback that was rated as more
applicable increased neural activation in left precuneus. In the
context of self-referential processing, the precuneus is related
to using autobiographical memory to place self-relevant stimuli
in a temporal context (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Northoff et al.,
2006). More applicable feedback may result in a better mood
through recognising oneself in the feedback.
Trait self-esteem was an important moderator of affective
and neural responses to social feedback. Individuals with lower
self-esteem felt worse after negative and intermediate feedback
compared to individuals with high self-esteem, which is in line
with previous findings that high self-esteem acts as a buffer
when rejected (Brown, 2010). On the neural level, low self-
esteem was related to decreased activation in the left MTG
during negative feedback. The MTG is implicated in reflective
emotional responding as opposed to a more reactive way of re-
sponding (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006; Frewen et al., 2011).
Overall, it seems that individuals with lower self-esteem are
more affected by negative feedback. As proposed in the intro-
duction, this could be related to a more fragile self-concept
(Campbell et al., 1996; Campbell et al., 2003). Individuals with
lower self-esteem did report an especially negative mood after
negative feedback that was less consistent with their self-
knowledge (i.e. less applicable feedback). Moreover, on the neu-
ral level, we found that applicability affected the processing of
negative feedback more for individuals with higher self-esteem,
reflected in more activation in the precuneus and PCC for more
applicable negative feedback. In contrast, individuals with low
self-esteem did not show these distinct activation patterns,
indicating that all negative feedback, regardless of the level of
applicability, was processed similarly. It could be that by differ-
entiating negative feedback on level of applicability, individuals
with higher self-esteem can process inapplicable negative feed-
back as not self-relevant and may therefore more easily dismiss
it (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Northoff et al., 2006). In contrast,
individuals with lower self-esteem seem to not filter negative
feedback based on applicability and may have more difficulty in
dismissing inapplicable negative feedback, which is also re-
flected in a worse mood.
With respect to positive feedback, individuals with lower
self-esteem showed decreased activation in the bilateral mPFC,
insula, ACC and PCC. Especially, the mPFC is important for re-
membering information that is relevant to the self (Kelley et al.,
2002; Philippi et al., 2012). This may point to decreased self-
referential thinking and self-appraisal for positive feedback
when self-esteem is lower (Ochsner et al., 2005; Northoff et al.,
2006). Individuals with lower self-esteem also showed
decreased activation in the left MTG and posterior TPJ for posi-
tive feedback that was more applicable. The TPJ as well as the
MTG are part of a large connectivity network in the brain which
shares self- and other-referential processing (Lombardo et al.,
2010; Molnar-Szakacs and Uddin, 2013). Possibly, when individ-
uals with high self-esteem receive a compliment that matches
Table 5. Neural correlates of trait self-esteem (RSES) in relation to valence and applicability of feedback
Contrast Cluster size Cluster P-value Label peak voxels Voxel test value MNI coordinates
Z X Y Z
RSESNeg 378 0.027 L Inferior temporal gyrus 3.78 46 10 22
L MTG, BA20 2.90 56 10 24
RSESPos 1528 <.001 R PCC 5.62 10 18 44
L ACC, BA24 5.12 4 0 44
L Postcentral gyrus, Precuneus 4.38 14 40 48
556 0.002 R IFG 4.01 56 16 2
R Insula, OFC, BA13 3.74 34 16 16
497 0.004 L Planum polare, BA22 4.06 50 4 6
L Insula 3.68 42 0 12
L MTG 3.39 48 8 20
RSESApplicability 636 0.001 L Angular gyrus 3.88 44 46 8
L MTG 3.87 48 44 2
RSESApplicabilityNeg 744 <0.001 R Precuneus, BA23 3.29 6 58 16
L Precuneus, PCC 3.29 4 58 14
RSESApplicabilityPos 324 0.036 L MTG 3.87 42 50 4
L Angular gyrus 3.68 44 46 8
Note: All clusters with selected peak voxels, cluster corrected z¼2.3, cluster P<0.05.
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with their own self-view, this may elicit a positive feeling of
mutual understanding and an affective connection with the
person providing the feedback. We did find that participants
who thought the feedback described them well in general also
thought more positively of the confederate and that this rela-
tionship was especially strong for people with higher self-
esteem. Positive applicable feedback may thus confirm positive
aspects of the self-knowledge as well as the social standing
with the other person. Interestingly, this process was not
observed in individuals with lower self-esteem. Despite rating
positive traits as equally relevant for their self-concept, individ-
uals with low self-esteem, may not receive the same ‘accept-
ance signals’ from positive feedback (Leary, 2005; Stinson et al.,
2010). This result and the three-way interaction with negative
feedback, though interesting, requires replication with more
participants as it was most affected by confounds, and should
therefore be interpreted with caution.
To conclude, individuals with low self-esteem may not only
have trouble with processing and filtering negative feedback
but also with the integration of positive feedback and feeling
connected to the other. Given the fact that our sample included
participants with clinically low self-esteem, this may be rele-
vant for patients who suffer from low self-esteem, as for ex-
ample in as SAD and BPD (Zeigler-Hill & Showers, 2007;
Rasmussen and Pidgeon, 2011). Indeed, these patients are more
vulnerable to rejection and BPD patients may not integrate posi-
tive self-relevant information well (Miano et al., 2013; Winter
et al., 2015). It would therefore be interesting to investigate how
the self-concept may play a role in dealing with social feedback
and how in turn social feedback may play a role in the self-
concept formation and maintenance in both SAD and BPD.
A strength of this study is that it not only replicated previous
findings with a larger sample, including clinically low self-
esteem participants, but also added to the existing literature by
simultaneously and thoroughly studying the role of valence, ap-
plicability and trait self-esteem on affective and neural re-
sponses to dealing with social feedback. Moreover, we used
statistical analyses i.e. multi-level analysis and parametric
modulation that were on trial basis which allowed for the ana-
lysis of the idiosyncrasy of the feedback to each individual.
Furthermore, the experimental paradigm proved very credible
and the positive and negative feedback induced clear affective
and neural responses. Finally, both affective and neural re-
sponses were integrated, as has been promoted in the field
(Eisenberger, 2015).
A limitation of this study is that applicability of feedback
words was measured after participants received the feedback
and may therefore be influenced by the feedback. The paradigm
did not allow for rating the feedback words before participants
were supposedly evaluated by these words. However, partici-
pants were explicitly instructed to rate how they thought these
words applied to them regardless of what the confederate
thought. Still, a replication of these findings where applicability
ratings are measured before evaluation is encouraged.
Moreover, we investigated females only and the results may
therefore not be generalizable to males as other studies have
shown that gender influences the responses to and coping with
social feedback (Stroud et al., 2002; Matud, 2004; Benenson et al.,
2013). Finally, it was not possible to statistically control for the
motor confound induced by left and right-hand button presses.
Given meta-analytic findings on finger tapping, we assume the
motor confound is restricted to the sensorimotor cortex and
cerebellum areas (Witt et al., 2008). Moreover, our confidence in
the neural findings is supported by similar findings in meta-
analyses on self-referential thinking, rejection and theory of
mind and our behavourial findings. However, future studies
should counter balance hand use.
Conclusion
Information received from others is important to construct and
validate the self-concept (Swann and Brooks, 2012) as well as to
inform us about our social standing (Leary, 2005). We showed
that specific self-views, i.e. consistency of self-knowledge with
feedback and global self-esteem, play an important role when
responding to social feedback. Individuals with low self-esteem
seem to process and filter negative feedback less effectively and
may perceive the relevance of positive feedback for their self-
concept and social standing less well. These new insights may
enhance our understanding of individuals with clinically low
levels of self-esteem and their difficulties navigating the social
world.
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